God’s Will To Save—We Distinguish
This question might best be framed as: Whether the divine will and the desire to save all are one and the same. The question is pressed by the majority of modern Evangelicals who are Arminian in their overall doctrine of salvation. However, both the majority Augustinian tradition of the Catholic Church for the millennium in between Orange (529) and Trent (1545-63) and the Reformed orthodox together affirm distinct senses of the divine will. The orthodox therefore reject a collapse of every sense of “will” into one in order to fit the surface readings and assumptions of any who would question God in either His right or goodness to save whom He wills. We consider four objections.
Objection 1. It seems that God‘s desire to save every person is one. Since the divine will and divine desire are one, as God is simple, God’s desire or willing to save all must be the same as this one will. Therefore, God has no other will than His will to save all.
Objection 2. If in one’s doctrine or in one’s interpretation of relevant passages of Scripture, God has a will that humanity is saved distinct from a will which does save, then God has two wills. But the orthodox all maintain that there is one will in God. Therefore, God has no other will than His will to save all.
Objection 3. Peter says that God is “not willing that any should perish” (2 Pet. 3:9); therefore, God has no other will than His will to save all.
Objection 4. Paul says to Timothy, that God “desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, God has no other will than His will to save all.
On the contrary, Jesus said, “this is the will of him who sent me, that I should lose nothing of all that he has given me, but raise it up on the last day” (Jn. 6:39). Since this will is that which will certainly be done, and since many will not be saved, it follows that God’s desire to save human beings, considered generally as His special creation, is distinct from the sense of divine will which guarantees salvation to His elect.
I answer that the term will can be meant in four relevant ways: The first is purely descriptive, and speaks only either in the tense of that which is to happen in the future, such as that “Tomorrow will be Thursday,” or as that which is connected by a logical necessity as to a principle, such as “the truth will set you free” (Jn. 8:32). The second references what someone determines to do, as when it says that God “works all things according to the counsel of his will” (Eph. 1:11), and with God such is invincible: “For who can resist his will?” (Rom. 9:19). The third references what one desires, as when someone “would rather you be thankful,” which is sometimes called a will of disposition or desire, as in Christ’s exclamation, “Would that you were either cold or hot!” (Rev. 3:15); now more often translated as “want” or “wish,” as in “I want you all to speak in tongues” (1 Cor. 14:5). The fourth is purely normative, which references what some authority would have someone else do, as in an imperative. Thus the Psalmist could pray, “Teach me to do your will” (Ps. 143:10). Was he praying that he would be able to make God’s choices for Him? Of course not! None of this is to suggest that these senses of will do not interact, but only that they must be distinguished. With respect to the will that is divine, the Hebrew and Greek languages exhibit distinct words for each sense for this very reason.
I also leave to the side the matter of distinguishing between the hidden and revealed, as well as necessary and free, senses of God’s will, as these overlap with the senses already described, but are not strictly necessary to discuss here. If they were added to our treatment, they would only make the point even stronger. Let us keep deep things as simple as possible.
Further, there have been two ways to understand the words of the apostles in those two passages cited above. The first is that the context of their words either rules out or makes immaterial the matter of a universal saving will. The second is to point out that a tension exists between God’s desire toward the salvation of all, and God’s will towards something else, the latter of which is the more supreme end in God‘s decree. Both positions exhibit this tension and neither can escape it. They simply give two different answers as to what this more supreme end is.
The Pelagian of old and the Arminian today says that this more supreme end is God’s respect toward the free will of man; the Augustinian of old and Calvinist of today says that this more supreme end is God’s respect to His own glory. We leave it to the reader to judge which end is taught in Scripture and which is not. There is of course one other option that avoids this tension. That option is actual universalism. In other words, if one chooses to believe that every single person will be saved in the end, then this desire or will of God references both His desire and His decree. There is no relation of chief end to subordinates to consider. However, since universalism is both a manifest heresy and not under consideration here, we leave an argument against it for another place.
Reply to Objection 1. Such a one-to-one-to-one correspondence begs the question as to whether God’s desire toward man’s ultimate good is in any sense distinct from the divine decree to the salvation of each or of every soul. Affirmation of the simplicity of God does not resolve that question. Therefore it is a non-sequitur to infer from the oneness of the divine will to the decree of salvation for all. Moreover, the orthodox do not fail to recognize a desire of benevolence in God toward every single human being, since this may refer to that general love of God toward His image in mankind, which is frequently addressed in Scripture. Indeed, some Calvinists have affirmed a general beneficence that is communicated as man’s greatest good, since, “The LORD is good to all, and his mercy is over all that he has made” (Ps. 145:9). Even this need not collapse the divine will into only one sense. The decree to save, fully and finally, a particular people does not negate all senses of goodness or even mercy to the universal human race. Who would deny that God could not invisibly save every single person if He so willed? Among particularists, then, one must either affirm a decree of predestination or deny God’s omnipotence or omniscience.
Reply to Objection 2. The one will of God speaks of what is essentially in God. We affirm this oneness and no other. To speak of different senses of a term, or any synonymous term, is to make a logical distinction with respect to terms—their sense and reference—and not a real distinction with respect to separable objects. Therefore, to affirm a logical distinction between the referents signified by diverse senses of will is not logically equivalent to denying the oneness of will as to the divine essence.
Reply to Objection 3. The context of Peter’s statement is the reason for the timing of the Lord’s return, which he directs toward those he calls scoffers. In an address to the elect, which he names as his audience at the outside of the letter, he tells them that, “The Lord is not slow to fulfill his promise as some count slowness, but is patient toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance.” The “any” in the statement is already defined by the “you,” and the reason for the addressed “you” is in the matter being discussed: His supposed reason for delay. Thus the reason that God is seeming to delay is that He is gathering every single last one of the elect. To tear the partial phrase out of its context represents a lazy and opportunistic reading.
Reply to Objection 4. While the above reason concerning ultimate and subordinate ends is sufficient to answer—namely, that this desire in God does not nullify His decree to treat the elect differently in salvation—in this other passage, the context is Paul’s instruction to Timothy to have the church in constant prayer for those in authority. His reason in the preceding verses is so that the gospel will go forth unmolested across political boundaries: i.e. to all peoples. It is a general statement about salvation being for all nations and therefore a desire that its messengers be unhindered. Paul is not here addressing the scope of salvation as to the prospect of each individual.
